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CHAPTER 2 
Representative Negotiation 
Trevor C. W. Farrow 
Introduction 
The Unique Role of Representative Negotiators 
While much of the literature on negotiation deals 
with the tools and strategies of negotiation in gen-
eral, this book deals with those tools and strategies 
in a specific context: representative negotiation. The 
role of representative negotiator is different from 
the role of direct negotiator, and brings with it a 
significant number of additional opportunities and 
challenges that need to be considered in order to 
understand its potential fully. 
This chapter will introduce some of the unique 
and defining aspects of the role of representative 
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negotiator. It will also set out some of the challenges that representative negotiators face-
challenges that are discussed in detail elsewhere in this book. The introductory section of 
this chapter discusses various contexts of representative negotiation, with a particular 
emphasis on legal negotiation. The next section of this chapter examines various merits and 
drawbacks of the representative's role, and looks at the threshoJd question of whether to 
engage a representative to as~ist with a negotiation. The following section of this chapter 
looks at the nature of representative negotiation, with a particular focus on the role of the 
representative and the competing interests that are potentially involved in a representative 
negotiation. Finally, for readers interested in pursuing these and related issues further, a list 
of selected sources is included in the last section of tliis chapter. 
11 
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Figure 2.1 
Various Contexts of Representative Negotiation 
We see the role of representative negotiator in all aspects of human interchange. Put simply, 
it is "everywhere."1 Starting with intimate or personal relations, sometimes family members 
or friends are asked to help deal with particularly important, thorny, or sensitive issues. More 
publicly, representatives are engaged to assist with the creation or transition of relationships 
and the resolution of disputes in almost all sectors of society involving almost all types of 
issues: commercial transactions, investment decisions, real estate deals, labour disputes, plea 
bargaining in criminal law, family disputes, immigration issues, education issues, etc. Finally, 
representatives are almost always used when relationships and disputes require a negotiated 
arrangement or settlement at government, regulatory, and international levels as well. 
Legal Representatives 
The relevance of representative negotiation in the context of law cannot be overstated. 
Because lawyers are often significantly involved in many if not most negotiated arrangements, 
negotiation plays a significant part in almost every lawyer's career. Put simply, it is a lawyer's 
"bread and butter." As Charles Wiggins and L. Randolph Lowry have commented, 
"We should've just dropped off our lists 
and taken our chances. But no, you had 
to bring a lawyer into the negotiations." 
Lawyers are a distinctive subclass of negotia-
tors. They are members of a profession that 
exisrs ro act as an interme<lia1 y ul.:l ween others 
involved in activities requiring bargaining. 
As such, they should be experts in managing 
the negotiation process. Virtually all trans-
action planning activiti.es require lawyers to 
negotiate on behalf of clients. Likewise, over 
ninety five per cent of all adjudicated disputes 
are resolved by some process other than 
courtroom proceedings.2 
As such, this chapter largely examines the 
role of the representative negotiator jn the 
specific context of legal representation. 
Source: CartoonStock.com, cartoonist-Baldwin.· 
l R.H. Mnookin, S.R. Peppet & A.S. Tulumello, Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in 
Deals and Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000) at 70. 
2 C.B. Wiggins & J .. R. Lowry, eds., Negotiation and Settlement Advocacy: A Book of Readings, 2d ed. 
(St. Paul, MN: Thomson, 2005) at 497. 
Deciding on When tQ Use 
Representative Negotiation 
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Direct Versus Representative Negotiation 
In the context of a negotiation, a threshold decision is whether to use a representative. To 
make this decision, clients should weigh the various merits and drawbacks of hiring a rep-
resentative for a specific negotiation. The following article by Jeffrey Rubin and Frank Sander 
tal<es a closer look at some of the considerations involved in choosing direct vs. representa-
tive negotfation. 
Jeffrey Z. Rubin and Frank E.A. Sander 
"When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs. Representative Negotiation" 
{1988) 4 Negotiation Journal at 395-401, footnotes omitted 
Although we typically conceive of negotiations occurring directly between two or more 
principals, often neglected in a thoughtful analysis are the many situations where negotia-
tions take place indirectly, through the use of representatives or surrogates of the principals. 
A father who speaks to his child's teacher (at the child's request), two lawyers meeting on 
behalf of their respective clients, the foreign service officers of different nations meeting to 
negotiate the settlement of a border dispute, a real estate agent informing would-be buyers 
of the seller's latest offer-each is an instance of negotiation through representatives. 
In this brief essay, we wish to build on previous analyses of representative negotiation 
to consider several key distinctions between direct and representative negotiations, and to 
indicate the circumstances under which we believe negotfators should go out of their way 
either to choose or to avoid negotiation through agents. 
The most obvious effect of using agents-an effect that must be kept in mind in any 
analysis of representative negotiation-is complication of the transaction. If we begin 
with a straightforward negotiation between two individuals, then the addition of two 
agents transforms this simple one-on-one deal into a complex matrix involving at least 
four primary negotiations, as well as two subsidiary ones. In addition, either of the agents 
may readily serve as a mediator between the client and the other agent or principal. Or 
the two agents might act as co-mediators between the principals. At a minimum, such a 
complex structure necessitates effective coordination. Beyond that, this structural com-
plexity has implications-both positive and negative-for representative negotiation in 
general. Let us now review these respective benefits and liabilities. 
Expertise 
One of the primary reasons that principals choose to negotiate through agents is that the 
latter possess expertise that_ makes agreement-particularly favorable agreement-more 
likely. This expertise is likely to be of three different stripes: 
Substantive knowledge. A tax attorney or accountant knows things about the current 
tax code that make it more likely that negotiations with an IRS auditor will benefit the 
client as much as possible. Similarly, a divorce lawyer, an engineering consultant, and a 
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real estate agent may have substantive knowledge in a rather narrow domain of expertise, 
and this expertise may redound to the client's benefit. 
Process expertise. Quite apart from the specific expertise they may have in particular 
content areas, agents may have skill at the negotiation process, per se, thereby enhancing 
the prospects of a favorable agreement. A skillful negotiator-someone who understands 
how to obtain and reveal information about preferences, who is inventive, resourceful, 
firm on goals but flexible on means, elc.-is a valuable resource. Wise principals would 
do well to utilize the services of such skilled negotiators, unless they can find ways of 
developing such process skills themselves. 
Special influence. A Washington lobbyist is paid lo know the "right" people, to have 
access to the "corridors of power" thal the principals themselves are unlikely to possess. 
Such "pull" can certainly help immensely, and is yet another form of expertise that agents 
may possess, although the lure of this "access" often oulweighs in promise the special 
benefits tha t are confirmed in reality. 
Note that the line separating these three forms of expertise is often a thin one, as in 
the case of a supplier who wishes to negotiate a sales contract with a prospeclive purchaser, 
and employs a former employee of the purchaser to handle the transaction; the former 
employee, as agent, may be a source of both substantive expertise and influence. 
Note also that principals may not always know what expertise they need. Thus, a person 
who has a dispute that seems headed for the courts may automatically seek out a litigator, 
not realizing that the vast preponderance of cases are seltled by negotiation, requiring 
very different skills that the litigator may not possess. So, although agents do indeed pos-
sess different forms of expertise that may enhance the prospects of a favorable settlement, 
clients do not necessarily know what they need; it's a bit like the problem of looking up 
the proper spelling of a word in the dictionary when you haven't got a clue about how to 
spell the word ju question. 
Detachment 
Another important reason for using an agent to do the actual negotiation is that the 
principals may be too emotionally entangled in the subjecl of the dispute. A classic example 
is divorce. A husband and wife, caught in the throes of a bitter fight over the end of their 
marriage, may benefit from the "buffering" that agents can provide. Rather than confront 
each other with the depth of their anger and bitterness, the principals may do far better 
by communicating only indirectly, via their respective representatives. Stated most gener-
ally, when the negotiating climate is adversarial- when the disputants are confrontational 
rather than collaborative-it may be wjser to manage the conflict through intermediaries 
than run the risk of an impasse or explosion resulting from direct exchange. 
Sometimes, however, it .is the agents who are too intensely entangled. What is needed 
then is the detachment and rationality that only the principals can bring to the exchange. 
For example, lawyers may get too caught up in the adversary game and lose sight of the 
underlying problem that is dividing the principals (e.g., how to resolve a dispute about 
the quality of goods delivered as part of a long-term supply contract). The lawyers may 
be more concerned about who would win in court, while the clients simply want to get 
their derailed relationship back on track. Hence the thrust of some modern dispute reso-
lution mechanisms (such as the mini-trial) is precisely to take the dispute out of the bands 
of the technicians and give it back to the primary parties. 
-
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Note, however, that the very "detachment" we are touting as a virtue of negotiation 
through agents can also be a liability. For example, in some interpersonal negotiations, 
apology and reconciliation may be an important ingredient of any re~olution (see, e.g., 
Goldberg, Green, and Sander, 1987). Surrogates who are primarily technicians may not 
be able to bring to bear these emphatic qualities. 
Tactical Flexibility 
The use of agents allows various gambits to be played out by the principals, in an effort 
to ratchet as much as possible from the other side. For example, if a seller asserts that the 
bottom line is $100,000, the buyer can try to haggle, albeit at the risk of losing the deal. 
If the buyer employs an agent, however, the agent can profess willingness to pay that sum 
but plead lack of authority, thereby gaining valuable time and opportunity for fuller 
consideration of the situation together with the principal. Or an agent for the seller who 
senses thal the buyer may be especially eager to buy the property can claim that it is nec-
essary to go back to the seller for ratification of the deal, only to return and up the price, 
profusely apologizing all the while for the behavior of an "unreasonable" client. The client 
and agent can thus together play the hard-hearted partner game. 
Conversely, an agent may be used in order to push the other side in tough, even obnox-
ious fashion, mal<ing it possible-in the best tradition of the "good cop/bad cop" ploy-
for the client to intercede at last, and seem the essence of sweet reason in comparison 
with the agent. Or lhe agent may be used as a "stalking horse," to gather as much informa-
tion about the adversary as possible, opening the way to proposals by the client that exploit 
the intelligence gathered. 
Note that the tactical flexibility conferred by representative negotiations presupposes 
a competitive negotiating climate, a zero-sum contest in which each negotiator wishes to 
outsmart the other. It is the stuff of traditional statecraft, and the interested reader can 
do no better than study the writings of Schelling (1960) and Potter (1948), as well as Lax 
and Sebenius (1986). To repeat, the assumption behind this line of analysis is that effective 
negotiation requires some measure of artifice and duplicity, and that this is often best 
accomplished through the use of some sort of foil or alter ego-in the form of the agent. 
But the converse is not necessarily true: Where the negotiation is conducted in a problem-
solvi ng manner (cf. Hsher and Ury, 1981), agents may still be helpful, not because they 
resort to strategic rnses, hut hec;rnse they can help articulate interests, options, and alter-
natives. Four heads arc clearly better than two, for example, when it comes to brainstorming 
about possible ways of reconciling the parties' interests. 
Offsetting-indeed, typically more than offsetting-the three above apparent virtues 
of representative negotiation are several sources of difficulty. Each is sufficiently import-
ant and potentially problematic that we believe caution is necessary before entering into 
negotiation through agents. 
Extra "Moving Parts" 
Rep~esentative negotiations entail greater structural complexity, additional moving parts 
in the negotiation machinery that-given a need for expertise, detachment, or tactical 
flexibility-can help move parties toward a favorable agreement. Additional moving parts, 
however, can also mean additional expense~ in the form of the time required in the find-
ing, evaluating, and engaging of agents, as well as the financial cost of retaining their 
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services. And it can mean additional problems, more things that can go wrong. For 
instance, a message intended by a client may not be the message transmitted by that cli-
ent's agent to the other party. Or the message received by that agent from the other party 
may l;>e very different from the one that that agent (either deliberately or inadvertently) 
manages to convey to his or her client. 
At one level, then, the introduction of additional links in the communication system 
increases the risk of distortion in the information conveyed back and forth between the 
principals. Beyond that lies a second difficulty: the possibility that eventually the principals 
will come to rely so extensively on their respective agents that they no longer communicate 
directly-even though they could, and even though they might well benefit from doing 
so ... Consider, for example, the case of a divorcing couple who, in explicit compliance 
with the advice of their adversary lawyers, have avoided any direct contact with each other 
during the divorce proceedings. Once the divorce has been obtained, w:iU the parties' 
abilily to communicate effectively with each other (e.g., over support and custody issues) 
be adversely affected by their excessive prior reliance on their attorneys? 
Yet another potentially problematic implication of this increasingly complex social 
machinery is that unwanted coalitions may arise that apply undue pressure on individual 
negotiators ... Greater number does not necessarily mean greater wisdom, however, and 
the pressures toward uniformity of opinion that result from coalition formation may 
adversely affect the quality of the decisions reached. 
In sum, the introduction of agents increases the complexity of the social apparatus of 
negotiation, and in so doing increases the chances of unwanted side effects. A related 
problem should be briefly noted here: the difficulty of asymmetry, as when an agent 
negotiates not with another agent but directly with the other principal. In effect, this was 
the case in 1978 when Egypt's Sadat negotiated with Israel's Begin at Camp David. Sadat 
considered himself empowered to make binding decisions for Egypt, while-at least partly 
for tactical purposes-Begin represented himself as ultimately accountable to his cabinet 
and to the Israeli parliament. v\Thile this "mismatched" negotiation between a principal 
(Sadat) and an agent (Beg:in) did result in agreement (thanks in good measure to President 
Carter's intercession as a mediator), it was not easy. The asymmetry of role meant that the · 
two sides differed in their readiness to move forward toward an agreement, their ability 
to be shielded by a representative, and their willingness/ability to guarantee that any 
agreement reached would "stick." 
Different dynamics will characterize the negotiation depending on whetl1er it is between 
clients, between lawyers, or with both present. If just the clients are there, the dealings 
will be more direct and forthright, and issues of authority and ratification disappear. With 
just the lawyers present, there may be less direct factual information, but concomitantly 
more candor about delicate.topics. Suppose, for example, that an aging soprano seeks to 
persuade an opera company to sign her for tl1e lead role in an upcoming opera. If she is not 
present, the opera's agent may try to lower the price, contending that the singer is passed 
her prime. Such candor is not recommended if the singer is present at the negotiation! 
Problems of "Ownership" and Conflicting Interests 
In theory, it is clear that the principal calls the shots. Imagine, however, an agent who is 
intent on applying the Getting to Yes (Fisher and Ury, 1981) approach by searching for 
objective criteria and a fair outcome. Suppose the client simply wants the best possible 
-
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outcome, perhaps because it is a one-shot deal not involving a future relationship with 
the other party. What if the agent (a lawyer, perhaps) does care about his future relation-
ship with the other agent, and wants to be remembered as a fair and scrupulous bargainer? 
How should this conflict get resolved and how, in the absence of explicit discussion, will 
it be resolved, if at all? Conversely, the client, because of a valuable long-term relationship, 
may want to maintain good relations with the other side. But if the client simply looks 
for an agent who is renowned for an ability to pull out all the stops, the client's overall 
objectives may suffer as the result of an overzealous advocate. 
This issue may arise in a number of contexts. Suppose that, in the course of a dispute 
settlement negotiation, a lawyer who is intent on getting the best possible deal for a client 
turns down an offer that was within the client's acceptable range. Is this proper behavior 
by the agent? The Model Rules of Professional Conduct for attorneys e>..-plicitly require 
(see Rules l.2(a), I.4) that every offer must be communicated to the principal, and perhaps 
a failure to do so might lead to a successful malpractice action against tl1e attorney if the 
deal finally fell through. 
Another illustration involves the situation where the agent and principal have divergent 
ethical norms. Suppose that a seller of a house has just learned that the dwelling is infested 
with termites, but instructs the agent not to reveal this facl, even in response to specific 
inquiry from the buyer. How should these tensions be fairly resolved, keeping in mind 
the fact that the agent may be subject to a professional code of conduct that gives direc-
tions that may conflict with the ethical values of the client? There may, of course, be arlf ul 
ways of dealing with such dilenunas, as, for example, slyly deDecting any relevant inquiry 
by the buyer. But preferably these problems should be explicitly addressed in the course 
of the initial discussion between agent and principal. To some extent, the problem may 
be resolved by fue principal's tendency to pick an agent who is congenial and compatible. 
But, as we pointed out before, principals are not always aware of and knowledgeable about 
the relevant considerations that go into the choice of an agent. Hence, if these issues are not 
addressed explicitly at the outset, termination of the relationship midstream in egregious 
cases may be the onJy alternative. 
Differing goals and standards of agent and principal may create conflicting pulls. For 
example, the buyer's agent may be compensated as a percentage of the purchase price, 
thus creating an incentive to have the price as high as possible. The buyer, of course, wants 
the lowest possible price. Similarly, where a lawyer is paid by the hour, there may be an 
incentive to draw out the negotiation, whereas the client prefers an expeditious negotia-
tion at the lowest possible cosl. 
While these are not insoluble problems, to be sure, they do constitute yet another 
example of the difficulties that may arise as one moves to representative negotiations. 
Although in theory the principals are in command, once agents have been introduced the 
chemistry changes, and new actors- with agenda, incentives, and constraints of their 
own- are part of the picture. Short of an abrupt firing of the agents, principals may find 
themselves less in control of the situation once agents have come on the scene. 
Encouragement of Artifice and Duplicity 
Finally, as already noted, the introduction of agents often seems to invite clients to devise 
stratagems (with or without these agents) to outwit the other side. Admittedly, there is 
nothing intrinsic to the presence of representatives that dictates a move in this direction; 
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still, perhaps because of the additional expense incurred, the seductive lure of a "killing'' 
with the help of one's "hired gun:' or the introduction of new, sometimes perverse incentives, 
representative negotiations often seem to instill (or reflect) a more adversarial climate. 
Conclusion 
It follows from the preceding analysis that, ordinarily, negotiations conducted directly 
between the principals are preferable to negotiation through representatives. When the 
principals' relationship is fundamentally cooperative or informed by enlightened self-
interest, agents may often be unnecessary; since there is little or no antagonism in the 
relationship, there is no need for the buffering detachment afforded by agents. Moreover, 
by negotiating directly, there is reduced risk of miscoordination, misrepresentation, and 
miscommunication. 
On the other hand, representative negotiation does have an important and necessary 
place. When special expertise is required, when tactical flexibility is deemed important 
and-most in1portantly-when direct contact is likely to produce confrontation rather 
than collaboration, agents can render an important service. 
Above all, the cl10ice of whether to negotiate directly or through surrogates is an 
important one, with significant ramifications. lt therefore should be addressed explicitly 
by weighing some of the considerations advanced above. And if an agent is selected, care-
ful advance canvassing of issues such as those discussed here (e.g., authority and ethical 
standards) is essential. 
Figure 2.2 sets out a number of factors-including those discussed above by Rubin and 
Sander-that should be considered when deciding whether to engage a representative for 
a given negotiation. 
Notes and Questions 
l. In addition to the list of merits and drawbacks set out in figure 2.2, can you think of 
other factors that should be considered when deciding whether to engage a repre-
sentative in a given negotiation? Could any of the factors listed as merits also be 
listed as potential drawbacks, or vice versa? In what circumstances? 
2. The factors discussed by Rubin and Sander-as identified and added to in figure 2.2-
contemplate a relatively dichotomous approach to choosing whether to engage a 
representative. It may be, however-particularly for more complex negotiations-
lhat this either/or approach to representation is inadequate as both a descriptive and 
normative approach. ~lients may want to be involved in a very engaged way for all 
or part of the negotiation process, even one that involves the active participation of 
a representative. For art approach that challenges the dichotomous approach of Rubin 
and Sander-one that contemplates more of a continuum of authority between 
principal and agent- see Neil E. Fassina, "Direcl and Representative Negotiation: A 
Principal-Agent Authority Continuum" (Paper presented at the !ACM 15th Annual 
Conference, June 2002) online: SSRN <http://ssrn.com/abstract=304973> or 
DOI: 10.2139/ssrn.304973. See also the additional considerations regarding the 
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Figure 2.2 Some Potential Merits and Drawbacks of Using 
Representative Negotiators 
Some Potential Merits Some Potential Drawbacks 
1. Expertise l. Complexity 
• Knowledge 2. Conflicts 
• Process Skill • Ownership 
• Special Influence • Conflicting Interests 
• Experience • Different Incentives 
• Resources 
3. Escalation 
2. Detachment • Encouragement of Client Artifice 
• Clear Thinking • Encouragement of Duplicity 
• Protection of Relationships • Encouragement of Competition 
• Encouragement of Cooperation 
4. Loss of Control 
3. Tactical Flexibility • Lack of Client Engagement 
4. Validation/Supporl • Lack of Accountability 
5. Lack of Shared/Perfect Information 
6. Cost (Time and Money) 
• Retaining an Agent 
• Monitoring an Agent 
Source: This figure is based-in part-on considerations discussed in J.Z. Rubin & F.E.A. Sander, 
"When Should We Use Agents? Direct vs. Representative Negotiation" (1988) 4 Negotiation Journal 
395; R.11. Mnookin, S.R. Peppet & A.S. Tulumello, Beyond Winning: Negotiating to Create Value in 
Deals and Disputes (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press, 2000) at 69-96; Hon. George W. Adams, Q.C., 
Mediating Justice: Legal Dispute Negotiations (Toronto: CCH, 2003) at 78-84. 
3. Docs a lawyer's ethical obligation to "advise and encourage the client to compromise 
or settle a dispute ... and ... discourage the client from commencing or continuing 
useless legal proccedings"3 include an obligation to consider whether such compromise 
is done directly or with the services of a lawyer? What, if any, conflict-of-interest 
issues does this question raise? For further ethical discussions of representative 
negotiation, see the following section of this chapter as well as chapter 5. 
Nature of Representative Negotiation 
Let's assume that the decision is made to retain a representative negotiator. What is the 
representative's role in a negotiation? What potentially competing considerations must a 
representative face? We look at the models that seek to answer these questions next. 
3 See e.g. Canadian Bar Association, Code of Professional Conduct, c. III. 6. 
\ 
\ 
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The Basic Role of the Representative Negotiator4 
The basic role of the lawyer is "to do something on behalf of someone else: typically the 
client;'5 In the context of a representative negotiation, "what is typically being sought is a 
negotiated deal or settlement that is to the benefit of the client, not the representative lawyer."6 
The resulting lawyer-client relationship is one that is often characterized-like the typical 
lawyer-client relationship-as one located in principals of agency. As a starting point, this 
characterization is helpful. The negotiator's reason for being, in the eyes of her client, is 
largely to negotiate a deal that is seen as favourable based on a calculus of the client's specific 
positions and interests, often (although certainly not always) as they relate to positions and 
interests of the other side. · 
The problem with this binary principal-agent vision of the role of the representative 
negotiator is that it almost invariably provides an inadequate understanding of what is 
actually going on, and what potentially could or should be going on, in the mind of the 
representative negotiator and between the representative and her client. 
A more nuanced description of representative negotiators starts to build on this agency 
vision by proposing that the representative's role is largely (or almost exclusively) character-
ized by two interests: those of her client and those of her bargaining opposite. For example, 
according to Wiggins and Lowry, "As representative negotiators, attorneys always have two 
negotiations occurring simultaneously: One with their bargaining opposite and one with 
their own client."7 
According to this more nuanced view, representative negotiators are said to occupy a 
"boundary-role position," in which they, as Dean Pruitt comments, "can be thought of as 
intermediaries whose job is to reconcile the interests of their own and the opposing organ-
ization. They must represent the interests of their constituents to the opposing representative 
and represent the views of the opposing representative to their constituents."8 
An expanded description of the interests at stake in representative negotiation-beyond 
the agency model that focuses almost exclusively on the interests of the representative's cli-
ent-helps to articulate more accurately the role of the representative negotiator. However, 
by primarily focusing on two interests-those of the client and those of the representative's 
bargaining opposite- the boundary-role position model still fails to account fully for what 
is typically going on inside the representative's mind. As such, although an improvement 
4 This section of this chapter is largely based on arguments presented in T.C.W. Farrow, "The 
Negotiator-as-Professional: Understanding the Competing Interests of a Representative 
Negotiator" (2007) 7:3 Pepperd~ne Dispute Resolution Law Journal (forthcoming), pa~-t of 
which is excerpted below. 
5 Ibid. at 3. 
6 Ibid. 
7 Wiggins & Lowry, supra note 2 at 498 (commenting on arguments presented in "When 
Should We Use Agents?"). But see also ibid. at 497. 
8 D.G. Pruitt, Negotiation Behavior (New York: Academic Press, 1981), cited in Wiggins & 
Lowry, supra note 2 at 500. 
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over the simple agency model, the boundary-role position model still docs not provide an 
adequate view of the role of the representative negotiator, both in terms of the role's respon-
sibilities, challenges, and potential opportunities. The next section of Lhis chapler expands 
on these models. 
Competing Strategic, Ethical, and 
Societal Considerations 
This section of this chapter-through the following article excerpt-provides a more expan-
sive view of the role of the representative negotiator that attempts to address potential 
deficiencies in the agency and boundary-role position models. 1b appreciate fully the role 
of the representative negotiator, it's important to have a broad understanding of the com-
peting interests and considerations it must manage. 
Trevor C.W. Farrow 
"The Negotiator-as-Professional: Understanding the 
Competing Interests of a Representative Negotiator" 
(2007) 7:3 Pepperdine Dispute Resolution Law Journal 
(forthcoming), footnotes omitted9 
III. Negotiator-as-Professional 
To address these deficiencies, I advance an alternative, expansive model of the representative 
negotiator that I ca LI the "negotiator-as-professional" model. Il is a model tba t sees the role 
of the representative negotiator as being defined not simply by the client's inleresls or by the 
two interests that are identified by the boundary-role position models, but rather by at 
least four sets of interests: client interests, a broad understanding of the representative's 
self-interests (that may include, but are not limited to, interests vis-a-vis the representative 
negotiator's bargaining opposite), ethical interests, and the public's interests. 
A. Client Interests 
1. Interests of the Representative's Client 
In any lawyering model, the representative's client maintains one of, and typically the 
prima1y set of interests in the relationship. This is the defining characteristic of the lawyer-
client relationship in the adversary system. In the context of negotiation, as Rubin and 
Sander point out, lav.ryer representatives bring to the table a particular "expertise" and a 
"tactical flexibility" to be used to the benefit of the client. Further, according to Pruitt, 
the "essence of the represel'l:tative effect" under the boundary-role position in negotiation 
9 Many of the sources noted in the omitted footnotes for the following article can be found in 
the list of selected further reading at the end of this chapter. 
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"is trying to please one's constituent" (a task that is obviously directly dependent on the 
client's interests). Therefore, as Pruitt further argues, "[i]t follows that bargainers who are 
representatives will usually be less conciliatory than those who are negotiating on their 
own behalf" and, subject to contrary instructions from the client, "representatives tend 
to view their constituents as desiring a tough, nonconciliatory approach to bargaining of 
the kind that is produced by a win/lose orientation." Here we see ourselves largely back 
to the "zealous advocate" tendency that foregrounds the interests of the client typically to 
the exclusion of essentially everything else. 
This model is further articulated in the negotiation context by Robert Cochran, who 
argues that not only should representatives tend to "please" the client, they should also 
afford a significant amount of deference to the client's choices in all aspects of the lawyer-
ing process. When looking at the question of "what choices the client should make:• 
Cochran answers by advocating that "courts f should] require lawyers to allow clients to 
make those choices which a reasonable person, in what the lawyer knows or should know 
to be the position of the client, would want to make:' Here again we see a strong prefer-
ence fo r the client's interest as the keystone to the relationship. 
So any model of the role of lawyer-as-negotiator must find a central position for the 
client's interests. However, the problem with models that focus essentially exclusively on 
the client's interests is that they are not accurate or honest in their description of what is 
in reality actually at p1ay in the minds of representative negotiators, nor do they account 
for the fact that representative negotiators do not, and often should not, necessarily align 
their interests with those of their clients (or forgo their or other interests) in the spirit of 
zealous advocacy. I can say with first-hand experience-as a litigator and negotiato.r 
turned academic-that as a conceptual matter, there are more interests at play than only 
those of the client. And as a practical matter, privileging the interests of the client does 
not always sit well with representative negotiators. 
An example from a recent negotiation class iJlustrates these concerns. In an animated 
debrief portion of an in-class mock negotiation that 1 recently conducted involving the 
intellectual property rights to artistic materials of the negotiating parties, a student of 
mine-after reflecting on the difficulty of maintaining a negotiation relationship with 
the other side as well as maintaining any sense of personal integrity vis-a-vis a very diffi-
cult position she was being asked to advance on behalf of her client-stated in shear 
frustration: "we started from a ridiculous position: our client simply wanted too much. 
Her position was [ ... ] crazy." The student's frustration resulted in a significant discussion 
about the role of the lawyer generally, and the lawyer-as-negotiator in particular. The easy 
response to her concerns was that she was her client's agent, and she could either conduct 
the negotiation or get off the file. However, that model-the simple agency model of 
lawyering that essentially backgrotmds all other interests in favour of strong client auton-
omy-did not sit at all well with her. Advancing instructions that in her view were 
"ridiculous" and "crazy" did not leave my student with either a good fee1ing about the 
specific case or about her general role as a representative negotiator. For her, notwilh-
standing her role as a lawyer-negotiator, there was clearly more at stake. 
Overly client-centric visions of the role of representative negotiator, like the model 
advanced by Cochran, do not help with this frustration, which belies interests at play 
other than those of the client. So the question then becomes: Do we need to live with that 
-
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frustration? Ts the zealous advocate view of the world the right (or only) one, particularly 
in light of concerns that leave the representative feeling frustrated, inadequate and perhaps 
hamstrung regarding potential alternative approaches and solutions? _\3ecause there are 
clearly interests other than those of the client that need to be recognized, the answer to 
this question, must be no. Before getting to some objections to this position, and further, 
to a set of interests involving the various potential self-interests of the representative 
negotiator that were at stake in my student's role-play example, I briefly (beJow) identify 
another set of client interests: those of the opposing client. 
2. Other Client's Interests 
Because this article deals with the mindset of the representative negotiator (and not spe-
cifically the mindset of principles), I do not spend much time here on the interests of the 
other side. Thinking about the interests of negotiation principals-by identifying, maximiz-
ing and/or minimizing mutual interests, creating space for mutual gains, value creating 
and value claiming, etc.-are important tools that are discussed elsewhere. However, it is 
obviously important-when thinking about the competing interests at stake in the mind 
of the representative lawyer-to make sure that the other side's interests, in addition to 
interests vis-a-vis the bargaining opposite, are on the table. 
The typical lawyer-client relationship militates against any responsibilily of the lawyer 
for the interests of the other side. Further, zealous advocacy models expressly reject such 
concerns. And my point here is not at all to say that the lawyer negotiator is now respon-
sible for the other side's interests, particularly when he is also represented. However, to 
the extent that alternative negotiation models are considered-for example strong coop-
erative models that actively include the other side's interests in the spirit of maintaining 
future relationships and mutual gains or hybrid models that contemplate the balance of 
value creation and value claiming-consideration for the other side's interests must at 
least be considered and discussed with the representative's client. And in any event, regard-
less of which negotiation model one follows, modern ethical codes are increasingly 
mandating consideration of the other side in the context of truth-telling and fair play. 
B. Representative Negotiator's Self-Interests 
Separate from client interests, there are a number of potential sets of self-interests at play 
for the representative in the negotiation process. When th inking ahout these interests, it 
seems to me that there are two questions that need to be addressed: What kind of nego-
tiator is the representative (hard, soft, principled, etc.)? And what pecuniary and other 
self-interests are at stake? While the representative's ethical interests could also be con-
sidered here, they are instead treated in a separate part of this article. 
1. Representative Negotiation. Style 
On the first question, negotiators must decide if they have the interest and skill to proceed 
with one or more negotiation styles, and if so, whether negotiation style is a topic open 
for discussion with his or her client. Some negotiators are of the view that they are unable 
to wear different negotiation "faces." Again turning to examples from my teaching, several 
students have recently indicated to me-in the context of role-plays that require experi-
mentation with different negotiation styles:._that they feel very uncomfortable putting 
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on a face or playing a role (the competitive negotiator, the cooperative negotiator, the bad 
cop, the tough guy, etc.) and that, in their view, their skills are maximized when they 
present themselves as an authentic and principled representative in all cases. Drawing on 
personal practical experiences as a litigator and settlement counsel, these concerns reso-
nate not only in the classroom but also amongst practicing representatives. 
These threshold concerns are typically and ultimately dealt with on a calculus of 
competence and context. To the extent that the lawyer representative and the client think 
that the lawyer's chosen approach renders them competent for the negotiation, then all 
is well: proceeding on the basis of the lawyer's preferred style, as discussed with the client, 
is the chosen course of instruction. To the extent that is not the case, codes of conduct 
typically require the lawyer to get off the case and recommend another representative. 
Further, in line with scholars who argue that some contexts- typically including one-off 
personal injury cases-often lend themselves better to one negotiating style over another 
(competitive negotiation for example), it may be that the context of a certain case deter-
mines the required level of competency with a given style. Again, choices will be made at 
this threshold stage regarding the approach and the continued retainer. 
If the representative is competent to proceed with one or more of a variety of different 
styles, the issue then becomes one of ownership. Who gets to choose with which style to 
proceed: the representative or the client? Here we see the potential of an obvious conflict. 
As Rubin and Sander discuss, there is often a potential conflict with a client's instruction 
(for example to achieve the best possible outcome in a one-off negotiation through the 
use of a competitive approach) and the interest of a representative negotiator (who would 
prefer, for example, to retain a relationship with the negotiator's bargaining opposite by 
using a cooperative approach). Similarly, Gifford and Pruitt's descriptions of both the 
"boundary role position" and the lawyer-as-negotiator position result in the same poten-
tial competing interests between the representative and the client. 
Now before I get into further discussion of this potential conflict, it should be recognized 
that even though the potential of competing interests exists, there does not necessarily 
need to be a conflict. Clearly a good relationship between the representative negotiator 
and the bargaining opposite can militate to the benefit of both the representative lawyer and 
the client. As Gifford recognizes, negotiating fairly with the other side does not mean a 
"selling-out" of the client's interests. Similarly, Pruitt argues that developing relationships 
with the other side can help both with the client's in1mediate outcome as well as poten-
tially with future negotiations: "Because they communicate with one another over a 
period of time and share similar organizational positions, representatives often develop 
ties to one another. These ties can contribute to the reconciliation of conflicts that would 
otherwise be intractable." 
However, when interests.do not align, the potential of conflict between the representa-
tive and the client is real and very typical. In these circumstances, the client-centered 
"zealous advocate" model advocates for the backgrounding of the representative's interests 
in favor of the client's preferences. This view of the negotiator's role fits Robert Cochran's 
model. For Cochran, if the representative lawyer viewed that a cooperative approach was 
appropriate, but the client preferred a competitive approach (perhaps in the context of a 
one-off real estate purchase for the client who does not anticipate being in a similar 
market position again), the client's preferences should prevail. According to Cochran, 
- .. 
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regardless of the lawyer's preference vis-a-vis the bargaining opposite, the client has a 
"right to choose the negotiating style." 
On the traditional lawyer-client relationship model, this view is not controversial. In 
fact, it is still largely the dominant view. The lawyer's role is to carry out the wishes of the 
client- period. As the argument goes, any other view of the role of the lawyer usurps a 
meaningful sense of client autonomy; and further, particularly given the virtual monopoly 
of power that lawyers have over the provision of increasingly essential legal services, any 
other view would essentially create an all-powerful oligarchy of lawyers. The problem 
with this unsubtle view of legal representation, however» is that it is not fully supported 
in the literature or in codes of conduct, and further, it ignores the daily reality of the 
negotiation process. Of course representatives will have interests. And so the question 
becomes: Why should those interests always take a back seal, particularly in cases-like 
the one involving my student- in which a client's position is "ridkulous"? In these cir-
cumstances, should a lawyers be ob.ligated to ignore their own views and interests and 
advance a "ridiculous" position? My view is that such an argument disingenuously ignores 
the reality of what actually goes on in the world of negotiations. Such an argument con-
veys an impoverished view of lawyering that does not make room for a representative's 
own views, interests and experiences in a given situation that may, at the end of the day, 
work to the benefit of the client's cause. This ultimately cheapens the overall negotiation 
process lo one that alienates negotiators-like my student- who are looking for a mean-
ingful place to practice their skills in a professional, reasonable and fulfilling way. Further, 
to the extent that codes of conduct prohibit the advancement of "frivolous" or "useless 
legal proceedings," query whether advancing a "ridiculous" position amotmts to unprofes-
sional conduct. 
The boundary-role position approach described by scholars lil<e Pruitt and Gifford 
aUows for the reality of potentially competing interests in the mind of the representative 
negotiator that zealous advocacy models tend to ignore. So when thinking about the 
potential interests at stake when preparing for a negotiation, the boundary-role position 
approach paints a more realistic landscape for the representative negotiator. At least now 
the tension in my student's mind has a voice and a place in the dialogue of negotiation 
preparation. And by actively recognizing these potentially competing interests, the lawyer 
can strategize about how to resolve them. In a purely zealous advocacy model, these 
considerations are left off the table (or are at least the elephants in the room that no one 
is meant to talk about). 
So far we have identified the client's interests and the representative's self-interests largely 
relating to negotiation styles vis-a-vis the bargaining opposite. It is with these interests 
that the current boundary role position schools of thought leave us. And because they 
consider all of these interests, and not simply the client's interests, they are an improve-
ment on the typically one-dimensional client-centered views of the zealous advocate. 
However, there are other interests at stake that still need to be considered as part of the 
representative's self-interests as well as other interests involving ethics and the public. 
2. Pecuniary and Other Self-Interests 
In addition to style and the representative's r~putation vis-a-vis the bargaining opposite, 
there are other potentially thorny self-interests at stake-particularly when negotiating 
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settlements in the context of litigation-that should be jdentified and put on the table as 
issues to be acknowledged and considered when preparing for a representative negotiation. 
So the second question that needs to be asked under this discussion of the representative 
negotiator's self-interests is: What pecuniary and other self-interests are at stake and what 
is the client willing to do aboul them? 
Wiggins and Lowry have articulated that negotiating attorneys and their clients "are 
like allies in warfare. Outwardly they may have an identity of goals and are bound together 
by professional obligations; yet internally they may have divergent interests and incon-
sistent long term objectives:' A number of potential conflicting interests arise in these 
circumstances. For example, to the extent that a piece of litigation is worth much more 
to the lawyer as a going concern as opposed to a settJed case, there are incentives to keep 
the case alive and adyjse against settlement. Along these lines, tbe lawyer-as-potential-
settlement-negotiator may also be much less risk averse when it comes to recommending 
trial over settlement, given potential desires for trial experience, exposure to the press, 
significant contingency fee rewards (which admittedly can cut both ways), and internal 
firm or community respect for being a tough, court-ready litigator (that also may be based, 
at least in tournament djscourse, on the desire to be thought of as "partnership material"). 
The choice of payment structures-for example percentage of outcome vs. hourly rate-
may also impact a representative's interests vis-a-vis approaching a negotiation. 
The underlying interests that raise these concerns are real and should be put on the 
table and considered in the context of full, sophisticated negotiation preparations. And 
typically there are solutions. Unlike self-interests based on the representative's reputation, 
purely financial self-interests are relatively easy to deal with. Codes of conduct typically 
paint rather bright conflict of interest lines in these areas that allow (or require) the lawyer, 
after recognizing the issues, to background his or her financial interests in the spirit of 
the very notion of lawyering itself. When it comes to some of the other, more personal 
or subtle concerns-undiluted focus on the trial process, a need to maintain a tough and 
ready litigation pose, etc.- there are other solutions, in addition to codes of conduct that 
require attorneys to consider settlement, which assist with potentially competing interests. 
For example, the use of parallel settlement counsel as a way not to distract the focused 
litigator from his or her endgame is a process-based on the literature and on my first-hand 
experience wjth the use of settlement counsel in complex civillltigation settlements-that 
can work quite effectively. 
Complicating (and clouding) these potential conflicting interests is the lawyer's inabil-
ity to understand, or willful blindness to, what the client's interests (and other interests) 
actually arc at the outset, as opposed to what the lawyer assumes (or wants) them to be. 
As Leonard Riskin recognized, the traditional zealous advocate tendency-based on the 
"lawyer's standard philosophical map" -blinds the lawyer to a number of things including 
the potential needs of the. client that may not be "legally meanjngful;' including many 
non-financial issues relating to "honor, respect, dignity, security, and love ... "To assist 
with this impoverished tendency of the traditional advocate, particularly in favor of 
promoting the benefits of mediation, Riskin argues in favor of expanding the traditional 
map. All interests, and not simply those located on the adversarial map, need to be taken 
into account and understood as part of the lawyer's role as a representative. As I have 
recently argued elsewhere, education, an open-mindset, and a shift in the adversarial 
culture are all already leading to these ideals becomfog more of a reality. 
-
-
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C. Representative Lawyer's Ethical Interests 
According to a March 2006 slalement by Brian A. Tabor, Q.C., President of the CBA: 
"Standards of professional ethics form the backdrop for everything lawyers do." As such, 
any model oflawyering-including lawyers as negotiators-must actively .embrace inter-
ests of an ethical nature. Therefore, in addition to reputalionaJ, pecuniary, and other 
self-i11tP.tP.sts, there arc also significant (potentially related) ethical interests of the repre 
sentative negotiator that need to be carefully considered in the context of developing the 
negotiator-as-professional model. There are two points of discussion here. The first, fun-
damental point deals with the relevance of the representative negotiator's own moral code. 
The second point deals with other ethical interests at play in a representative negotiation. 
1. What Kind of Lawyer Ts the Representative Negotiator? 
The basic question that I am interested in here is: What kind of lawyer is the representative 
negotiator? Is the negotiator a zealous advocate driven solely by the client's self-interest; 
or is the negotiator an agent whose moral outlook also counts in the calculus of the 
principal-agent relationship, particularly regarding the kinds of cases taken, the results 
sought, and the tools used? This question-that goes to the heart of professionalism 
itself- has been nicely framed by Rob Atkinson: 
Should a professional always do all that the law alJows, or should the professional 
recognize other constraints, particularly concerns for the welfare of third parties? 
This question divides scholars of legal ethics and thoughtful practitioners into two 
schools: those who recognize constraints other than law's outer limit, and those 
who do not. 
Because I have written elsewhere on this topic relating to lawyers generally, I will only 
briefly develop the basic issues here as they relate specifically to the representative nego-
tiator. As a preliminary matter, there continue to be strong arguments for following 
Atkinson's second school: what counts is what is legal, and non-legal considerations-
including a lawyer's personal ethical interests-are not relevant in terms of the lawyer's 
representation of his or her client. Traditional and still dominant views of the lawyer's 
role as a zealous advocate- as reinforced by codes of conduct and academic literature 
n~g::i rrl i ng the lawyer's role in general and the negotiator's role jn particular-support th is 
school of thought. 
The problem is that, notwithstanding this dominant school of thought, some repre-
sentative negotiators, as a practical matter, are persuaded by Atkinson's other school of 
thought: that non-legal considerations-again including a lawyer's personal ethical inter-
ests- should not be irrelevant. Again drawing on examples from my teaching, many 
students are uncomfortable with the notion of negotiating deals, the underlying ethical 
consequences of which they fundamentally disagree with. For instance, going back to my 
original example of the negotiation student who was representing a client with ridiculous 
and crazy instructions in an hypothetical role-play, when pushed in the de-brief session 
on whether she would take that case, she responded: "I'm not sure, if l had a choice, that 
I would work for someone like my client in the negotiation ... she's an egomaniac." 
Forttmately, representative negotiators do ·have a choice. So the question then becomes: 
Why should we pursue a model of professionalism that requires representative negotiators 
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to negotiate deals on behalf of their clients that they would never negotiate for themselves 
or in any event that they think are ridiculous? The answer in my view is that we should 
not. Clearly there are times, particularly after a retainer has been accepted and negotia-
tions are under way, when the lawyer may be asked to take positions professionally that 
s/he would not take personally. But these situations aside, there are many occasions when 
the lawyer's interests and views should be voiced in the spirit of improving the underlying 
cause as well as the overall system, notwithstanding an individual client's initial desires. 
In this spirit, Allan Hutchinson, for example, argues for a model that does not require 
lawyers "to forgo moral judgment," for to do otherwise reduces them to "amoral techni-
cians with significant drawbacks and limitations ... " What this looks like fo practice is 
making choices about what negotiations a representative takes, and what tools and nego-
tiation styles they are willing to use once a client is taken on. Of course this is all done 
with the client's knowledge and instructions. And if instructions are not forthcoming, 
the lawyer should get off the file. 
Before we dismiss all of this as moral meandering without a sound basis in legal policy, 
we should also recognize that professional codes of conduct-as supported by competing 
academic literature-support the relevance of a lawyer's morality, sense of justice, honour, 
and ethics. For example, according to the preamble and scope of the Model Rules:" ... The 
Rules do not .. . exhaust the moral and ethical considerations that should inform a lawyer, 
for no worthwhile human activity can be completely defined by legal rules." The CPC 
states: the "lawyer should not hesitate to speak out against an injustice." Similar consid-
erations regarding the relevance of broad notions of morality and honour obtain in various 
regional jurisdictions. For example, according to The Lawyer's Code of Professional Respon-
sibility (LCPR) of the New York State Bar Association ("NYSBA"), "A lawyer should be 
temperate and dignified, and refrain from all illegal and morally reprehensible conduct." 
Further, according to the preface of the Code of Professional Conduct of the Law Society 
of Alberta ("LS.A'.'):" . .. the rules and regulations ... cannot exhaustively cover all situa-
tions that may confront a lawyer, who may find it necessary to also consider ... general 
moral principles in determining an appropriate course of action." 
Although not uncontroversial, there is therefore a tension even within the various codes · 
of conduct between the responsibility to zealously represent a client and the potential 
role for the lawyer's own ethical interests, whether based on morality, a sense of honour 
or some other social norm. Regardless, there is clearly a basis for the relevance of-and 
in my view an overriding professional obligation at least to consider-the lawyer's own 
ethical interests in the context of his or her role as a representative negotiator. 
As such, these interests-which are not recognized by either the simple client-centered 
models or the more expanded boundary role position models of representative negotia-
tion-should be recognized as interests that influence the lawyering and negotiation 
processes and, as such, neec:l to be on the table for discussion when the negotiator-as-
professional sits down to prepare for the representative negotiation process. The end 
calculus becomes a discussion between the representative lawyer and the client. The final 
decision of whether to stay with the representative always rests with the client. But the 
fundamental decisions regarding whether and how the negotiation is handled are also 
decisions regarding which the lawyer should have determining input. Any other model, 
not only turns a bbnd eye to reality, but also impoverishes the responsibilities and possi-
bilities of the representative's role. 
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. 2. Other Ethical Interests of the Representative Negotiator 
In addition to the fondamental question of the relevance of the representative negotiator's 
personal moral compass, there are other ethical issues that come up all .the time in rep-
resentative negotiations that need to be considered and discussed with the ~Jie.nt. Gifford, 
when discussing the boundary role position model, does contemplate the notion of pro-
fessiona 1 responsibility in passing: 
When negotiating on behalf of the client . .. the lawyer is drawn in. conflicting direc-
tions. On the.one hand, she is obligated professionally to obtain the most favorable 
settlement possible during the negotiations ... On the other hand ... he must 
respond to pressures from his negotiating counterparts ... and pursue settlements 
that are fair and just to both parties. The pressure on the lawyer to accommodate 
these tensions .. . results in part from the expectations of future contact with the 
other lawyers and in part from the traditional courtesy and fair play among lawyers 
[emphasis added]. 
While this is right, ethical considerations involve more than simply "courtesy and fair play 
among lawyers." Terms like "courtesy:' "fair play:' and-as Silver articulates, the "duty of 
'good faith' towards other counsel"-are unlikely to be precise enough, or wide-reaching 
enough, to place adequate limits on "dishonest bargaining practices" and other such nego-
tiation tactics. What we are therefore talking about, in addition to "fair play," etc., is a full 
range of ethical. and professional considerations, including obligations of confidentiality, 
truth-telling, the avoidance of conflicts of interest, and the like. Neither the client-centered 
model nor the boundary role position model adequately and expressly embraces a full 
consideration of the representative negotiator's ethical considerations and interests. 
That is because, surprisingly, the consideration of ethics continues to be a relatively 
. new issue in negotiation theory. As Eleanor Norton comments, " [t]here has been little 
evidence of or interest in coherent standards or express norms for appropriate behavior 
in negotiations." Similarly, as Lynn Epstein comments: "[n]egotiations have always enjoyed 
a certain amount of protection from ethical constraints. This protection is due to a long-
standing tradition of allowing parties to negotiate freely, and witl1out restrictions that 
encompass other aspects of legal representation. Historically, this freedom surrounded 
most negotiations in a shroud of secrecy." Although there is starting to he more focus 
recently on ethics and negotiation, Epstein's description still largely obtains. Often when 
ethics are raised, it is typically done in passing, as an afterthought, or at ]east as a separate 
discussion that does not form part of the central make-up of the representative negotia-
tor's very being as a professional. 
This inadequate treatment of ethics jeopardizes the adequate training, ethical prepara-
tion and professional conduct of representative negotiators. As Wiggins and Lowry have 
argued, "there is a clear potential for conflict between the attorney's own values and the 
perceived duty of single-minded zealous advocacy on behalf of the client's interests." 
Shockingly, this impoverished state of affairs- that results in a "confounding [of] the 
boundary of professional responsibility and negotiation ethics"-apparently makes it 
"difficult to ... make prescriptive statements about truth telling and lawyers." These 
acknowledgments amount, in my view, to a remarkably sad state of affairs. If lawyers 
cannot be counted on, or at least mandated to tell the truth, who can? What we are left 
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with then is a relatively barren ethical terrain that leaves the representative negotiator 
without adequate guidance for ethical negotiation. Current practices encourage Gross 
and Syverud, for example, to ask questions such as: "Under what circumstances should a 
party make a sincere offer? An outrageous demand? An insincere threat to go to trial?" 
Further, for example, Holmes comments that "the concept of truthfulness in negotiation 
raises unique ethical questions because in most circumstances candor is not necessarily 
required." Silver articulates that representative lawyers "can be misleading, can bluff and 
can threaten action at will." Further, Boulle and Kelly argue that, even for lawyers governed 
by professional codes of conduct, "in negotiation .. . exaggeration and sheer puffery are 
tolerated." As such, Wiggins and Lowry question whether "the profession should attempt 
to police lying in negotiation" at all. 
In my view, this ethically questionable state of affairs in representative negotiation should 
not be tolerated, particularly for representative negotiators who are also members of the 
bar and subject to professional obligations. The negotiator-as-professional must actively 
embrace ethical problems, both in preparation with the client and then during the negotia-
tion process itself. And to the extent that a client seeks to foreground her personal interests 
over the ethical concerns and interests of the representative negotiator, that move must be 
either rejected through active discussions with the client-which often in any event work 
to the benefit of the client's case- or the lavqer must get off the file in accordance with 
principles of professionalism. In my view there is no middle ground. James White has argued 
that much of the difficulty in regulating negotiation behavior comes from the fact that 
"11eeoti<1tion is a non-public behavior." That may be right as a descriptive matter. However, 
we do not seem to have an appetite for accepting borderline ethical behavior in law's public 
sphere. We should be even less accommodating of such behavior in the private sphere. 
D. The Public's Interests 
The fourth general set of interests at play in representative negotiations includes con-
siderations of interests to the public. While notions of personal morality and ethical 
considerations are bound up with notions of the public good, particularly in the context 
of the regulation of lawyers, a further question also needs to be considered: should a 
representative negotiator consider, during deliberations with the client, the public worth 
of a given outcome of the negotiation process? In my view, the answer is yes for the 
negotiator-as-professional. 
Here again traditional models of representative negotiation are either actively against 
these sorts of public-welfare considerations (based in zealous advocacy principles) or 
essentially silent. A typical example of this opposition is the following statement by Abe 
Krash: a lawyer's "views of the public interest arc immaterial to his [or her] professional 
responsibility." For Riskin, the basic reason for this opposition or silence is that models 
of lawyering that celebrate. the zealous advocate blind the lawyer to, or mandate against, 
a number of considerations including "the overall social effect of a given result." 
ln opposition to this indifference, Duncan Kennedy- o n the theory that lawyers 
should" [t]ry ... [thcirj best .. . to avoid doing harm with ... [their] lawyer skills"-argues 
that lawyers "shouldn't take the case if ... [they] think it would be better for society, or 
more moral, for the cJient to lose." Similarly, Allan Hutchinson argues for a "fresh account 
oflegal ethics (that l would . .. encourage lawyers to develop a critical morality that encom-
passes such pressing issues as 'what ldnd of lawyer do I want to be?' and 'what interests am 
..., 
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l going to spend my life serving as a lawyer?'" Finally, at the 1971 "Excellence in Advocacy" 
program of the Advocacy Institute, held in Ann Arbor, Michigan, the celebrated author 
Martin Mayer argued that: 
[I]f lawyers cannot look at the society as a whole and say that certain aspects of 
their work ... represent a plus for this society and for the world of our children, 
then they had better look to last-ditch defenses. Better yet, lawyers should try to find 
a way to salvage what is worth doing out of their work and be influential in the 
production of what is going to happen next. 
Again, these are certainJy not uncontroversial positions, particularly given the underpinnings 
of the dominant zealous advocate model located in strong notions of a freedom-seeking 
adversary system. But they are positions, again, that certainly find support in current 
codes of conduct. Por example, the CBA states that the "primary concern" of the CPC is 
"the protection of the public interest." Accordingly, "the lawyer should not hesitate to speal< 
out against an injustice." So to the extent that a representative negotiator is being asked 
to take a position that he considers not to be in the "public interest" or that amounts to 
an "injustice" (terms that are not typically defined in codes of conduct), then he is profes-
sionally encouraged to seek alternative solutions and/or to "speak out." ln my view these 
alternatives specifically include speaking out during negotiation preparation sessions with 
a client who is trying to advance a cause that amounts, in the eyes of the lawyer, to an 
"injustice"; or in the eyes of my negotiation student, to something that is "ridiculous." 
This will obviously be context and lawyer specific. But that is OK. And it is certainly not 
a reason to shy away from the opportunity to do good, or at least to avoid doing harm, 
with a representative's negotiation skills. That is the opportunity and the responsibility, 
in my view, of the negotiator-as-professional. 
E. Other Interests 
I have raised four basic sets of interests that I think must be considered by representative 
negotiators when approaching any given client's retainer. In addition, there may be other 
interests, including competing interests of various constiluencies within a representative's 
own client (like, for example, when negotiating labor issues on behalf of a trade union or 
land claim rights on behalf of a eronp nf native bands), or competing public interests (like, 
for example, when negotiating on behalf of a coalition Qf community groups or public-
interest NGOs) that arc not easily reconciled during a representative's contemplation of 
a given course of conduct. Often tradi tional conflict of interest rules will assist with these 
considerations. However, in situations in which equally valid public interests are at stake, 
bona.fide contextual and individual reflection may be the onJy available tool. Further, client 
or representative interests tegarding race, gender, culture, and power may, and often do, 
significantly influence the negotiation process. Regardless of the interest or choice, the 
point here is that active consideration of and deliberation about all interests must occur. 
Iv. Potential Objections: Zealous Advocacy and Conflicting Interests 
Perhaps the two biggest obstacles to my vision of the negotiator-as-professional are both 
the dominant zealous advocate model itself and the potential of irreconcilably competing 
interests. Because I have already taken up objections from the zealous advocacy model in 
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lhe context of representative negotiations, I do not address them further here, other than 
briefly to say the following. There is no doubt that the arguments and considerations that 
I am advancing in this article are not supported by the still-dominant model of the zealous 
advocate. They are therefore neither uncontroversial nor unproblematic. However, because 
my vision of lhe lawyer-as-negotiator is supported, at least in part, from a theoretical 
perspective by both the literature and aspects of current codes of conduct; and further, as 
a praclical matter, by the intuitions and experiences of both experienced and novice nego-
tiators, there is clearly both something lacking about the current models and something 
appealing about my alternative model. So while I acknowledge the continued hurdles that 
dominant, zealous advocacy models put in the way of my arguments, because of their 
own problems, my view is that we need to continue to search fo r alternative models. The 
negotiator-as-professional is one such alternative model that, in my view, does a better 
job of capturing both theoretical opportunities and practical realities of the representative 
negotiation process. 
Equally challenging to my arguments is a further question: what if the representative 
is not able to reconcile the competing interesls in her mind in any given negotiation? The 
simple answer to this question is: just because the calculus is difficult does not mean that 
the lawyer should not engage in it. Resorting to the zealous advocate model for expediency 
reasons does not do justice either to it or to alternative models. A slightly more compel-
ling answer comes from the realm of professional responsibility: lawyers are bound to 
consider a broad conception of the competing interests at stake in a negotiation, both as 
a competence matter and as an ethical matter. So professionally, the issue is likely closed. 
However, this again does not really deal with the practical-and typical-situation of 
competing interests. What should the lawyer do? 
A typical situation involves a conflict between the interests of the representative's client 
and interests vis-a-vis the representative's bargaining opposite. This conflict-discussed 
above-is what Gifford and others identify as a "boundary-role conflict." The obvious 
answer is to try to work out with the representative's cUent-during the preparation 
stage-a solution that maximizes the potential of both interests. For example, clients often 
do not appreciate the power of a good relationship between negotiators. Alternatively, 
they often do not realize, as generally discussed above, tbat a good relationship between 
negotiators does not mean that their interests are being somehow inadequately protected. 
This initial hard work with a representative's client, with full disclosure of the represent-
alivc's views and interests, will. typically resolve many of these conflicts. However, if a 
solution cannot be worked out, one option-that I have argued against-is Cochran's 
preference for dominant client control. The alternative vision that I am suggesting is 
leaving significant control with the lawyer that may ultimately lead, in particularly tough 
situations, to a lawyer's withdrawal from a case. While an imperfect solution, it is a prefer-
able solution to preferring.a model that impoverishes the importance of other interests 
(a model that potentially forces the lawyer to check him or herself- and his or her moral 
compass-at the door on arrival at work every morning). 
Again, the point of my model is not necessarily to solve all potentially thorny circum-
stances with a one-size-fits-all approach (that is one of the dangerously attractive features 
of the zealous advocate model). No nuanced model or code, in my view, provides such a 
solulion. For example, as the CPC recognizes, "[i] nevitably, the practical application of the 
Code to the diverse situations that confront an active profession in a changing society will 
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reveal gaps, ambiguities and apparent inconsistencies." The lawyer-as-professional model 
does not necessarily offer further comfort. \A/hat it does offer, however, is a forced nod to 
reality that takes into account all that is going on in the representative's mind. It also-in 
a real way-takes seriously ethical, public and other interests that current representative 
negotiation models do not. And when conflicts do arise, the negotiator-as-professional 
is not apologetic, when appropria tc, in preferring (with full disclosure to the client) ethical 
and public interests over those of his or her client. This again can align with the spirit of 
the professional obligations oflawyers generally. As the CFC provides, in situations of con-
flict or competing ethical considerations: "the principle of protection of the public interest 
will serve to guide the practitioner to the applicable principles of ethical conduct ... " 
Again, far from irrelevant, a lawyer's "personal conscience" and "sensitive professional 
and moral judgment" will animate a lawyer's thinking in applying and resolving compet-
ing ethical obligations. 
At the end of the day, what the model offers is hopefully a nuanced calculus of all 
interests that are on the table. This account should assist in situating the representative's 
role vis-a-vis the client and others potentially involved or interested in a negotiation. Jn 
tough cases-when representative and client interests appear to collide-the model will 
assist in the difficult work that is done in advance of the negotiation in the context of 
discussions between the representative and his or her client when contemplating a retainer 
or, later, when preparing for a negotiation. And finally, if conflicts persist, it is acknowl-
edged- in these tough cases-that the model may not ultimately assist with the resolution 
of those conilicts. However, even then, the model will succeed in giving adequate authority 
and support to the representative who is trying- vis-a-vis the competing interests that 
are still at play-to work out what he should do, with knowledge of the client, including 
potentially declining to accept or continue with a retainer. 
V. Conclusion 
What I have tried to argue is that representative negotiation models advanced to-date, 
like the zealous advocacy model or the "boundary role position" model lose sight of, or 
only pay passing lip service to, the many (and potentially competing) interests that make 
up the mindset of a representative negotiator. The negotiator-as-professional model takes 
seriously a much more expansive view of potentially competing interests in the mind of 
the representative negotiator. Because the different interests will come up in different ways 
and may or may not compete in any given situation, the importance of this model is not 
that it paints bright lines in terms of resolving all tensions at all times; but rather that it 
assists in identifying the competing interests at play and thereby forces the representative 
negotiator to address and potentially resolve competing interests and conflicts ahead of time 
rather than simply ignoring them, being unaware of them, or being trapped by them. 
At the end of the day, choices need to be made in the negotiation process. And.they need 
to be made with the client. Should different negotiation styles be considered? If so, who 
has the final say? Based on whose interests, etc.? What is the desired outcome? Again, whose 
interests should drive this calculus? Etc. And these choices may also lead to representatives 
declining a given client's brief. This is all a healthy part of the negotiation process. And 
as 1 bave argued, the alternative- ignoring these interests and tying the representative>s 
hands in favor of blind zealous representation-is not a healthy (or professional) way to 
proceed. 
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Further, and in any event, representative negotiators should care about this discussion 
because the client's case, while clearly central to the representative's mental calculus, is 
only one case. The lawyer's approach and reputation as a representative negotiator in the 
legal community follow him or her for an entire career. And while it takes years to develop 
a solid reputation as a lawyer and negotiator, it takes about five minutes to destroy one. 
So the lawyer clearly has a personal, professional and financial stake in his or her reputa-
tion as a lawyer and negotiator-independent of the client-vis-a-vis negotiation style 
and the bargaining opposite. These same interests will also likely be at stake for the rep-
resentative's bargaining opposite. They therefore need to be considered as meaningful 
aspects of the processes when preparing for a negotiation. 
In my view, the negotiator-as-professional model should find favor in, or at least be 
potentially beneficial to, all layers of the legal community. In terms of clients, to the extent 
that lawyers are hired to provide expertise, not only regarding the substance of a given 
problem, but also on the process of how that problem should be resolved, resting significant 
control over that process in the hands of lawyers should, as a systemic matter, work to 
the benefit of clients and their causes. It is also of benefit to clients on the theory that full 
communication is not only professionally required but is also beneficial to their interests. 
The model will benefit lawyer representatives individually and the profession generally, 
not only in giving lawyers significant control over how they negotiate, but also in how they 
feel about themselves as empowered agents in the building of their client's cases and their 
own careers. Finally, this model will also potentially benefit society as a whole, both through 
increased general professional behavior as well as specific lawyering conduct that takes 
seriously social welfare considerations in the calculus of competing courses of conduct. 
As I have readily acknowledged, there may be some cases in which competing interests 
do not lend themselves well to resolution, and in those cases, lawyers will need to think 
seriously a bout withdrawal from the case. But as I have argued, what we are tallcing about 
is not simply learning how to negotiate one case for one client, but rather what a law-
yer-and certainly a representative legal negotiator-does during a significant portion 
of his day for a significant portion of his or her career. Without taking seriously all of 
these potentially competing interests, my view is that we proceed with a very impoverished 
sense of what that career has, does, can and should look like. Without taking seriously all 
of these interests, we do not have an adequate answer to my student who is otherwise 
dissatisfied and disillusioned with the potential of a career as a representative negotiator. 
The negotiator-as-professional model, in my view, provides us with a better sense of the 
lawyer's role that will help to address some of the theoretical and practical challenges and 
opportunities of the representative negotiation process. 
Notes and Questions 
1. The following excerpt is from the "1be Negotiator-as-Professional" article (at p. 28): 
"Clearly there are times, particularly after a retainer has been accepted and negotia-
tions are under way, when the lawyer may be asked to take positions professionally 
that s/he would not take personally. But these situations aside, there are many 
occasions when the lawyer's interests and views should be voiced in the spirit of 
improving the underlying cause as well as the overall system, notwithstanding an 
_, 
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individual client's initial desires." Do you agree, and if so, in what circumstances 
would you take a position that you wouldn't otherwise take? Alternatively, when 
might you prefer your own interests over those of your client? How and why? Does 
your view of the lawyer's role in the adversary system influence your views on these 
issues? 
2. Murray L. Schwartz, in his article "The Profe.ssionalism and Accotmtability of Lawyers" 
(1978) 66 Cal. L. Rev. 669 at 671, argues, among other thiogs, that in lawyering 
situations in which arbiters are not present- expressly invoking the lawyer's role as 
a "negotiator" or "counsellor" - the "non-advocate lawyer should be held morally 
accountable for assistance rendered the client even though the lawyer is neither 
legally nor professionally accountable." Do you agree? 
3. Does the excerpt from "The Negotiator-as-Professional" article or the Schwartz 
quotation (above) anin1ate how you might respond to the following two hypotheti-
cal examples (which are also excerpted from "The Negotiator-as-Professional" 
article at n. 62)? 
( 1) A rich, speculative, private land developer asks you to negotiate a deal with a slum 
landlord over the purchase of a fully-functioning low income rental facility that currently 
houses 80 families in favour of its demolition and replacement with a high-end multi-use 
condo facility that would house 8 high income families. (I have been influenced by 
Duncan Kennedy regarding this hypothetical. See Duncan Kennedy, "The Responsibility 
of Lawyers for the Justice of Their Causes" (1987) 18 Tex. Tech. L. Rev. 1157 ... ) (2) The 
CEO of a large privately-held downsizing transnalionaJ security firm asks you to negoLi-
ate a deal that would result in the termination of all employees of the Jewish or Muslim 
faith, based on your client's unfounded occupational requirement theory that these 
employees, while "good people:' simply pose too much of a reputational and security 
risk (in terms of attacks against security officers in the field) and therefore are too costly 
to the firm. 
In each case, what would you do? Why? 
4. How do professional codes of conduct apply to the roles and approaches of repre-
sen tative negotiators in the hypothetical scenarios set out above? See, for example, 
the provisions regarding settlement and negotiation in the American Bar Association, 
Model Rules of Professional Conduct (2006 ed.), onlil)e: ABA <http://www.abanct.org/ 
cpr/mrpc/mrpc_toc.html> and t·he \.arnidi:rn R::ir Association, Code of Professional 
Conduct (adopted by council, August 2004 and February 2006), online: CBA 
<http://www.cba.org/CBA/activities/pdf/codeofconduct06.pdf>. For an example of 
more extensive provisions, see the Law Society of Alberta, Code of Professional 
Conduct, online: LSA <http://www.lawsocietyalberta.com/files/Code.pdf> at c. 11 
("The Lawyer as Negotiator") . 
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